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Abstract
We show that for generic economies, every equilibrium admits Pareto improving monetary policy,
even with multiple commodities per state.
The main assumption is that asset incompleteness be intermediate, in that household heterogeneity
does not exceed the number of assets present and absent.
We argue this as a special case of the general framework in Turner (2003b) for proving the generic
existence of Pareto improving taxes.
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01I n t r o d u c t i o n
When asset markets are incomplete, there are almost always many Pareto improving policy interventions, if
there are multiple commodities and households. Remarkably, these policies do not involve adding any new
markets.
We show the generic existence of Pareto improving monetary policy, assuming its ability to set price
levels. The argument follows the general framework of Turner (2004b) for the generic existence of Pareto
improving taxation.
The protagonist is the price adjustment following an intervention. Its role is to improve on asset insurance
by redistributing endowment wealth across states, as anticipated by Stiglitz (1982). The price adjustment
is determined by how monetary policy and prices aﬀect aggregate demand.
If monetary policy targeting current incomes is Pareto improving, then it must cause an equilibrium price
adjustment, Grossman (1975). Conversely, if the price adjustment is suﬃciently sensitive to risk aversion,
then for almost all risk aversions and endowments, Pareto improving monetary policy exists, as we show. We
then verify this sensitivity test with standard demand theory, which Turner (2003a) extends from complete
to incomplete markets.
Turner (2003a) develops the Slutsky theory of demand for commodities and assets in incomplete markets.
First, it shows how a Slutsky matrix decomposes into substitution and income eﬀects the derivative of demand
with respect to commodity prices and yield structure. Next, it identiﬁes the Slutsky matrix’s properties.
The Slutsky matrix can be perturbed arbitrarily, subject only to preserving these properties, by perturbing
the underlying utility’s Hessian, while ﬁxing point demand and marginal utility.
These Slutsky perturbations for possibly incomplete markets generalize the Slutsky perturbations for
complete markets, ﬁrst introduced by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1980), who proved the latter two
results in the complete setting. Then Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) introduced the study of generic
improvements with incomplete markets, applying the Slutsky perturbations. Since they allowed the central
planner to decide the agents’ asset portfolios, they did not need to go beyond perturbing the Slutsky matrices
of commodity demand. To show why weaker interventions may improve welfare, such as anonymous taxes
1or changes in asset payoﬀs, it became necessary to take into account how agents’ portfolio adjustments
caused a further price adjustment. Naturally, this required perturbing asset demand as well as commodity
demand. The lack of a Slutsky theory for incomplete markets blocked contributions for over ten years1,
until a breakthrough by Citanna, Kajii, and Villanacci (1998), who analyzed ﬁrst order conditions instead of
Slutsky matrices. Researchers have extended the theory of generic improvements with incomplete markets
to many policies by applying this ﬁrst order approach; Cass and Citanna (1998), Citanna, Polemarchakis,
and Tirelli (2001), Bisin et al. (2001), and Mandler (2003). Turner (2003b) is an alternative approach based
on the original strategy of Slutsky perturbations, as is the present work on monetary policy.
Tirelli (2000) shows the generic existence of Pareto improving capital income taxation, when there is—
unlike here—a single commodity per state hence no commodity price adjustment. The reason Pareto im-
provements are possible is that the intervention improves on the asset span. Although our intervention is
monetary and not ﬁscal, it also changes the asset span, whose welfare impact we must add to the welfare
impact of the change in commodity prices. Our argument shows that generically we can engineer these two
welfare impacts toward a Pareto improvement, under the extra hypothesis that the asset incompletness is
intermediate—they need not cancel each other out.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 presents a general model of policy, and details monetary
policy as an example. Section 3 has the formula for the welfare impact of policy. Section 4 obtains the
generic existence of Pareto improving policy from the sensitivity condition on price adjustment, which it
then reinterprets in terms of the Reaction of Demand to Prices and to Policy. Section 5 summarizes the
demand theory in incomplete markets necessary to check the sensitivity in terms of the Reactions, then
section 6 checks it for monetary policy. Section 8 derives the welfare impact formula, and spells out the
notation and the parameterization of economies.
1The sole one is Elul (1995).
22G E I L 2 model
Households h =1 ,...,H know the present state of nature, denoted 0, but are uncertain as to which among
s =1 ,...,S nature will reveal in period 1. They consume commodities c =1 ,...,C in the present and
future, and invest in assets j =1 ,...,J in the present only. Each state has commodity C as unit of
account, in terms of which all value is quoted. Markets assign to household h an income wh ∈ R
S+1
++ ,t o
commodity c<C ap r i c e p·c ∈ R
S+1
++ ,t oa s s e t j ap r i c e qj ∈ R and future yield aj ∈ RS.W ec a l l
(p·c)C
1 = p =( ps·) the spot prices, q =( qj) the asset prices, (aj)=a =( as) the asset structure, and
w =( wh) the income distribution, P ≡ R
(C−1)(S+1)
++ × RJ.3 Taxes are t ∈ T,T some Euclidean space,
negative coordinates corresponding to subsidies. The set of budget variables is
b ≡ (P,a,w,t) ∈ B ≡ P × RJ×S × R
(S+1)H
++ × T
and has some distinguished nonempty relatively open subset B0 ⊂ B. B0 is B with T = {0}.
Demand for commodities and assets d =( x,y):B0 → R
C(S+1)
++ ×RJ is a function on B0. The demand
dh =( xh,yh) of household h depends on own income only, (xh,yh)(P,a,w,t)=( xh,yh)(P,a,w0,t) if
wh = w0h. Policy payment τ : B0
0 × codom(d) → RS+1×dim(T) is a function such that τ(b0,d)t is
the actual payment, if demand and policy parameters are d,t. Policy (τh)h is anonymous if τh is
independent of h,a n dpolicy revenue τ is τ(b0,(dh)h) ≡ Στh(b0,d h).
An economy (a,e,t,t∗,d) consists of an asset structure a, endowments e, policy parameters t,
distribution rates t∗, and demands d. For each household h, endowments specify a certain number
eh
sc > 0 of each commodity c in each state s,t h edistribution rates specify a fraction th
∗ > 0 with
Σth
∗ =1 ,a n ddemands specify a demand dh. Let Ω be the set of (a,e,t,t∗,d).4




yh(b)=0 r − τ(b0,(dh(b))h)t =0
and b ≡ (P,a,(wh
s = eh0
s ps + th
∗rs)h
s,t) ∈ B0
2”L” stands for linearity in the policy’s parameters of the implied transfers.
3The numeraire convention is that unity is the price of sC,s ≥ 0,w h i c h P therefore omits. The addition to p of the
sC,s ≥ 0 coordinates, bearing value unity, is denoted p. We use the notation P =( p,q) ∈ P.
4The appendix spells out the parameterization of demand d.
3We say (a,e,t,t∗,d) ∈ Ω has equilibrium (P,r) ∈ P × RS.AGEI is a GEIL with t =0 .
Under neoclassical assumptions (a,e,0,t ∗,d) ∈ Ω has an equilibrium5, and then the implicit function
theorem gives conditions for a neighborhood of (a,e,0,t ∗,d) to have an equilibrium.
2.1 Neoclassical demand
Consider the budget function β














Demand dh =( xh,yh) is neoclassical0 if T = {0} and there is a utility function u : R
C(S+1)




u throughout B0 Xh
0(b) ≡ {x ∈ R
C(S+1)
+ | β
h(b,x,y)=0 , some y ∈ RJ}
More generally, demand dh =( xh,yh) is neoclassical if there is a utility function u : R
C(S+1)
+ → R with
u(xh(b)) = max
Xh(b)
u throughout B0 Xh(b) ≡ {x ∈ R
C(S+1)
+ | β
h(b0,x,y)+τh(b0,x,y)tb =0 , some y ∈ RJ}6
If policy tb =0 is inactive, Xh(b)=Xh
0 (b). Thus neoclassical demand restricts to neoclassical0 demand.
Neoclassical welfare is v : B0 → RH,v(b)=( vh(b)) ≡ (uh(xh(b))).
The interpretation of X is that the cost of consumption x in excess of income w is ﬁnanced by some
portfolio y ∈ RJ of assets, net of policy payments. A portfolio speciﬁes how much of each asset to buy or
sell (yj ≷ 0), and aj
s how much value in state s an asset j buyer is to collect, a seller to deliver.
2.2 Monetary policy as an example
As in Magill and Quinzii (1992), monetary policy is able to deﬂate the price level ˜ ps =
ps
1+ts in each state
from the original ts =0 to a new ts 6=0 . At a GEI, this amounts to being able to change the asset structure
˜ a = a(I +[ t]) from the original t =0 t oan e wo n e t ∈ RS, where throughout [] converts a vector ∗
into a diagonal matrix [∗].
5Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).
6The functions b → b0,→ tb are (p,q,a,w,t) → (p,q,a,w,0),→ t. Here y is deﬁned by x,i f a is full rank.
4If portfolios are yh at a GEI, then they payoﬀ a0yh. More conveniently, the change in the payoﬀ as a










We shall need to change t only in the ﬁrst H coordinates—assuming S ≥ H, i.e. ts =0 for s>H .Thus
the above tS∈ R




























with t ∈ RH. We may view this change in payoﬀ as the policy payment, on switching its sign; the monetary



















Debreu’s smooth preferences imply neoclassical demand exists, and is smooth in a neighborhood of b.
3W e l f a r e i m p a c t o f p o l i c y
We think of a smooth path t = t(ξ) of policy through t =0 ,a n do finﬁnitesimal policy as its initial velocity
˙ t = ˙ t(0). Suppose the active GEI (P,r;a,e,0,t ∗,d) is regular in that such a path lifts locally to a unique





s,t(ξ)). Thus policy impacts welfare only via the budget vari-
ables it implies. By the fundamental theorem of calculus the welfare impact is the integral of Dbvh· ˙ b,w h i c h
b ya b u s ew ec a l lt h ewelfare impact. We compute this product in the appendix, using the envelope theorem






5Proposition 1 (Envelope) The welfare impact ˙ v ∈ RH of inﬁnitesimal policy ˙ t at a regular GEI is
˙ v =( λ)0 ˙ m ˙ m =( th




Here (λ)0 collects the households’ marginal utilities of income across states, and ˙ m the impact on their
incomes, private and public. The private one is the impact ˙ r on revenue distributed at rate t∗ ∈ RH net
of the impact τh˙ t on policy payments, plus the impact on portfolio payoﬀs, and the public one is the impact
on the value of their excess demands z in all nonnumeraire markets, that implied by the impact ˙ P on
prices.
Policy targeting welfare must account for the equilibrium price adjustment it causes. The equilibrium
price adjustment undoes the excess aggregate demand that policy causes, and depends on the reactions of
aggregate demand to both policy and prices.
Proposition 2 (Revenue Impact) At a regular GEI ˙ r = τ ˙ t.
This follows from r = τt, the chain rule, and t =0 at a GEI. At a regular GEI there is a price
adjustment matrix dP, smooth in a neighborhood of it, such that ˙ P = dP ˙ t. Thus the welfare impact is
dv =( λ)0 ¡
(th
∗τ − τh + ΨhDta)h − zdP
¢
A policy targeting current incomes is (ﬁrst order) Pareto improving only if policy causes a price adjustment.
For if τh
s≥1˙ t =0 ,dP˙ t =0 then Σ 1
λh
0




h0 ˙ mh = Σ ˙ mh
0 = Σ(th
∗τ0 − τh
0 +0 )=0 so ˙ v À 0 is
impossible. Next we prove a converse.
4 Framework for generic existence of Pareto improving policy
We prove the generic existence of Pareto improving policy, stressing the role of changing commodity prices
over the role of the particular policy. Existence follows directly from a hypothesis on price adjustment. Thus
the policy is relevant only insofar as it meets the hypothesis on price adjustment. Then we reinterpret this
6hypothesis on dP in terms of primitives, the Reaction of Demand to Prices and the Reaction of Demand
to Policy.
Pareto improving policy parameters exist if there exists a solution to dv˙ t À 0.I nt u r nt h i se x i s t si f
dv ∈ RH×dimT has rank H, which in turn implies that policy parameters outnumber household types
dimT ≥ H. The key idea is that if dv =( λ)0(th
∗τ −τh)h −(λ)0zdP is rank deﬁcient, then a perturbation of
the economy would restore full rank by preserving the ﬁrst summand but aﬀecting the second one. Namely,
if some economy’s dP is not appropriate, then almost every nearby economy’s dP is.
We have in mind a perturbation of the households’ risk aversion (D2uh)h,w h i c ha ﬀects nothing but
dP in the welfare impact dv. Now, to restore the rank the risk aversion must map into (λ)0zdP richly
enough. Since this map keeps (λ)0z ﬁxed, we require that (λ)0z have rank H and that dP be suﬃciently
sensitive to risk aversion. Cass and Citanna (1998) gift us the ﬁrst requirement:
Fact 1 (Full Externality of Price Adjustment on Welfare) Suppose asset incompleteness exceeds house-






Fact 2 At a regular GEI, dP is locally a smooth function of risk aversion; the marginal utilities λ
i,p o l i c y
payments τi, and excess demands zi are locally constant in risk aversion.
For k ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J we say that a commodity coordinate is one of the ﬁrst (S +1 ) ( C − 1).
Deﬁnition 1 At a regular GEI, dP is k-Sensitive to risk aversion if for every α ∈ Rdim(T) there is
a path of risk aversion that solves k0d ˙ P = α0.7 It is Sensitive to risk aversion if it is k-Sensitive to risk
aversion for all k with a nonzero commodity coordinate.
Figure 1
Assumption 1 (Generic Sensitivity of dP) If H>1, then generically in endowments and utilities, at
every GEI dP is Sensitive to risk aversion.
Figures 2, 3
7The appendix spells out a path of risk aversion. Here the dot denotes diﬀerentiation with respect to the path’s parameter.
7This assumption banishes the particulars of the policy, leaving only its imprint on dP. Of course, dP
is deﬁned only at regular GEI, so implicitly assumed is that regular GEI are generic in endowments.
Theorem 1 (Logic of Pareto Improvement) Fix the policy and the desired welfare impact ˙ v ∈ RH.
Grant the Generic Sensitivity of dP under dim(T),S− J ≥ H>1,C >1. Then generically in utilities
and endowments, at every GEI ˙ v is the welfare impact of some ˙ t ∈ T. Hence a nearby Pareto superior
GEIL exists.





nonnumeraire excess demand equations
γ0(λ)0 ¡
(th
∗τ − τh + ΨhDta)h − zdP
¢
=0
r − τt =0
γ0γ − 1=0
Suppose this is transverse to zero and the natural projection is proper. By the transversality theorem, for
generic endowments and utilities, this system of (dimp+dimq)+dim(T)+dimr+1equations is transverse
to zero in the remaining endogenous variables, which number dimp +d i mq +d i mr + H.B y h y p o t h e s i s
dim(T) ≥ H, so for these endowments and utilities the preimage theorem implies that no endogenous
variables solve this system—every GEI has dv with rank H.
This is transverse to zero. As is well known, we can control the ﬁrst equations by perturbing one
household’s endowment. For a moment, say that we can control the second equations and preserve the top
ones. We then perturb the third equations and preserve the top two, by perturbing r as well as numeraire
endowments—to preserve incomes wh
s = eh0
s ps + th
∗rs. We control the fourth equation and preserve the top
three, by scalar multiples of γ. So transversality obtains if our momentary supposition on γ0dv holds:












since λ,τi,z are locally constant. We want to make α arbitrary, and we can if dP is k-sensitive, which
holds by assumption if k has a nonzero commodity coordinate. It has: Full Externality of Price Adjustment
on Welfare, C>1,γ 6=0 imply γ0(λ)0z is nonzero in the coordinate m = s1 for some s ≤ H − 1.
8That the natural projection is proper we omit. (The numeraire asset structure is ﬁxed.)
We have seen that policy targeting current incomes, such as monetary policy, supports a Pareto improve-
ment only if there is a price adjustment. Conversely, policy generically supports a Pareto improvement if
the price adjustment is suﬃciently sensitive to risk aversion. Therefore price adjustment is pivotal.
4.1 Expression for Price Adjustment
Before we can check whether a particular policy meets the Sensitivity of dP to Risk Aversion, we need
an expression for dP. We express dP in terms of the Reaction of Demand to Prices and the Reaction of
Demand to Policy, notions which are well deﬁned at an active GEI.
Let an underbar connote the omission of the numeraire in each state, deﬁne
d : B0 → R
(C−1)(S+1)
++ × RJ d = Σd
h
and the aggregate demand of (a,e,t,t∗) ∈ Ω
da,e,t,t∗(p,q,r) ≡ d(p,q,a,(wh
s = eh0
s ps + th
∗r)h
s,t)
with domain Pa,e,t,t∗ ≡ {(p,q,r) ∈ P × RS+1 | (p,q,a,(wh
s = eh0




∇≡Dp,qda,e,t,t∗ the Reaction of Demand to Prices
∆ ≡ Drda,e,t,t∗ · τ + Dtda,e,t,t∗ the Reaction of Demand to Policy9
(1)
Suppose a path of GEIL (P(ξ),r(ξ),a,(eh0
s ps(ξ)+th
∗rs(ξ))h











is an identity in the path’s parameter ξ.D i ﬀerentiating with respect to it,
∇ ˙ P + Drda,e,t,t∗ · ˙ r + Dtda,e,t,t∗ · ˙ t =0
8Pa,e,t,t∗ is open, as the preimage by a continuous function of the open B0. Recall the notation P0 =( p0,q0).
9Clearly Drda,e,t,t∗ = ΣDwhdhth
∗.
9Substituting for ˙ r = τ ˙ t from the Revenue Impact proposition,
∇ ˙ P + ∆˙ t =0
An active GEI is regular if ∇ is invertible. By the implicit function theorem, a regular GEI lifts a local
policy through t =0 to a path of GEIL through itself, such as the one just above.
Proposition 3 (Price Adjustment) At a regular GEI the Price Adjustment to inﬁnitesimal policy is
dP = −∇
−1∆ (dP)
where the Reactions ∇,∆ are deﬁned in (1).
4.2 Primitives for the Sensitivity of Price Adjustment to Risk Aversion
Given the Logic of Pareto improvement, we want to check whether a policy meets the Generic Sensitivity of
dP. We provide primitives for the Sensitivity of dP,t h a n k st oe x p r e s s i o n( dP)10:
d ˙ P = −∇
−1 ˙ ∆ + ∇
−1 ˙ ∇∇
−1∆
Recall equation k0d ˙ P = α0 from deﬁnition 1. If ˙ ∆ =0 and ˜ k0 ≡def k0∇
−1 then the equation reads
˜ k0 ˙ ∇∇
−1∆ = α0. If ∆ has rank dim(T) then there is a solution β to β
0∇
−1∆ = α0 so it suﬃces to solve
˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = β
0. Thus dP is k-Sensitive if (1) ∆ has rank dim(T),( 2 ) ˜ k is nonzero everywhere, (3) whenever ˜ K
is nonzero everywhere and β ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J, there is a path of risk aversion that solves ˙ ∆ =0 , ˜ K0 ˙ ∇ = β
0.
(Take ˜ k = ˜ K.) Thus Generic Sensitivity of dP follows from the following (independently of the ˜ k deﬁned):
Lemma 1 (Activity) If H>1, generically in endowments every GEI is active and regular.11
Assumption 2 (Full Reaction of Demand to Policy) If C>1, generically in utilities and endow-
ments, at every GEI ∆ has rank dim(T).
10Applying the chain rule to JJ−1 = I gives d
dξJ−1 = −J−1( d
dξJ)J−1.
11We do not argue this relatively simple statement. For these endowments, both ∆ and dP are deﬁned.
10Lemma 2 (Mean Externality of Price Adjustment on Welfare is Regular) Generically in utilities,
at every regular GEI, whenever k is nonzero in some commodity coordinate, ˜ k0 ≡ k0∇
−1 is nonzero every-
where.
Assumption 3 (Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions) If H>1, then generically in endowments
and utilities, whenever ˜ k ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J is nonzero everywhere and β ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J,a te v e r yG E I
there is a path of risk aversion that solves ˙ ∆ =0 ,˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = β
0.
These primitives for the Generic Sensitivity of dP and the Logic of Pareto Improvement yield
Theorem 2 (Test for Pareto Improvement) Fix the policy and the desired welfare impact ˙ v ∈ RH.
Say the policy passes the Full Reaction of Demand to Policy and the Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions
under dim(T),S−J ≥ H>1,C>1. Then generically in utilities and endowments, at every GEI ˙ v is the
welfare impact of some ˙ t ∈ T. Hence there is a nearby Pareto superior GEIL.
Next we illustrate how to check whether a policy passes this test via demand theory in incomplete
markets, as developed by Turner (2003a). We show that the monetary policy in the introduction pass this
test, and therefore generically admit Pareto improving parameters, owing to the unifying logic of a sensitive
price adjustment. At a GEI ∇ will turn out to be independent of the policy, so we will verify the lemma
on the Mean for one and all policies.
5 Summary of demand theory in incomplete markets
We must check whether each policy meets the Full Reaction of Demand to Policy and the Suﬃcient Indepen-
dence of Reactions. For this we report the theory of demand in incomplete markets as developed by Turner
(2003a). The basic idea is to use decompositions of ∆,∇ in terms of Slutsky matrices, and then to per-
turb these Slutsky matrices by perturbing risk aversion, while preserving neoclassical demand at the budget
variables under consideration. We stress that this theory is applied to, but independent of, equilibrium.
115.1 Slutsky perturbations










⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦


























In showing the diﬀerentiability of demand, the key step is the invertibility of H(D2u). Slutsky matrices










where S,c are symmetric of dimensions C∗ +J,S +1 and m =( mx,m y) is C∗ +J ×S +1. A Slutsky
perturbation is ∇ = H(D)−1 − H(D2u)−1, for some symmetric D ≈ D2u that is close enough for
the inverse to exist. A Slutsky perturbation is a perturbation of Slutsky matrices rationalizable by some





˙ S − ˙ m




and view a Slutsky perturbation as a triple ˙ S, ˙ m, ˙ c. We identify Slutsky perturbations, without reference to
the inversion deﬁning them, in terms of independent linear constraints on ∇ :
on ˙ S ρ0 ˙ S =0 and ˙ S is symmetric
on ˙ m ρ0 ˙ m =0 and ˙ mxW0 =0
on ˙ c ˙ cW0 =0 and ˙ c is symmetric
(constraints)
Theorem 3 (Identiﬁcation of Slutsky perturbations, Turner 2003a) Given u smooth in Debreu’s
sense and b in B0 with t =0 , consider the Slutsky matrices H(D2u)−1. Every small enough Slutsky
12perturbation ∇ satisﬁes (constraints). Conversely, every small enough perturbation ∇ that satisﬁes
(constraints) is Slutsky: H(D2u)−1 +∇ is the inverse of H(D) for some D that is negative deﬁnite and
symmetric.
We use only Slutsky perturbations with ˙ m, ˙ c =0 by choosing ˙ S as follows. A matrix ˙ S ∈
R(C−1)(S+1)+J×(C−1)(S+1)+J is extendable in a unique way to a matrix ˙ S ∈ RC∗+J×C∗+J satisfying
ρ0 ˙ S =0 ;w ec a l l ˙ S the extension of ˙ S. It is easy to verify that if ˙ S is symmetric, so is its extension. In
sum, any symmetric ˙ S deﬁnes a unique Slutsky perturbation with ˙ m, ˙ c =0 .
5.2 Decomposition of demand
The relevance of Slutsky perturbations is that they allow us to perturb demand functions directly, while
preserving their neoclassical nature, without having to think about utility. This is because Slutsky matrices




+ − mh · ([xh]0 : yh
0) (dec)
Here Lh






















⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
mh = Dwhdh, and ([xh]0 : yh


























s ps)s as [eh]0p,w eh a v e Dp,q[eh]0p =( [ eh]0 :0 ) ,s of r o m( 1 )w eh a v e
∇ = ΣDp,qd
h + mh · ([eh]0 :0 )




+ − mh · ([xh − eh]0 : yh
0)




+ − mh · zh0 (∇)
This decomposition of the aggregate demand of (a,e,t,t∗) ∈ Ω generalizes Balasko 3.5.1 (1988) to
incomplete markets.
One implication of the decomposition is that ∇ is independent of the policy. So let us now provide
Proof that Mean Externality of Price Adjustment on Welfare is Regular. See Turner (2003b).
There is another decomposition of the reaction Dad


























⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
S×SJ
and a is parameterized as a long column vector
a =
⎡






⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
6 Pareto improving monetary policy
We check for each policy the Full Reaction of Demand to Policy and the Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions.
In computing
∆ = Dtda,e,t,t∗ +( ΣDwhd
hth
∗) · τ
14we use the following notation for S
















We can perturb Ph arbitrarily and get a Slutsky perturbation.
Remark 1 In checking the Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions, the ˙ S
h
Slutsky perturbations aﬀect only
the Jacobian ˙ ∇ = Σ ˙ ShLh
+ in (∇). Also, we solve ˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = β
0 piecemeal, solving ˜ k0 ˙ ∇p = β
0
p,˜ k0 ˙ ∇q = β
0
q by
splitting ˙ ∇ =[˙ ∇p : ˙ ∇q].
6.1 Monetary policy
Theorem 4 Fix the desired welfare impact ˙ v ∈ RH. Assume intermediate incompleteness, S − J,J ≥ H,
and H,C > 1. Then generically in utilities and endowments, at every GEI ˙ v is the welfare impact of some
˙ t ∈ T. Hence there is a nearby Pareto superior GEIL with active monetary policy.
Proof. The next lemmas and dim(T)=H enable theorem 2.
To compute ∆ = Dtda,e,t,t∗ +(ΣDwhd
hth
∗)·τ, note that τ =0 for monetary policy, thanks to Σyh =0:


















So ∆ = Dtda,e,t,t∗. Monetary policy’s eﬀect on budget variables is only on the asset structure. Thus
Dtda,e,t,t∗ = ΣDad
hDta. To compute Dta, we write the new asset structure as
˜ a =
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
a1 ....
0 . 0 ..





















⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
SJ×H
Further, from decomposition (2)
Dad











This simpliﬁes slightly if we let Λh
H,Ψh
H,a H be Λh,Ψh,a truncated of the coordinates corresponding to

















































Lemma 3 (Full Reaction of Demand to Policy) If C>1,J ≥ H ≥ 1, generically in utilities and
endowments, at every GEI ∆m has rank dim(T).
Proof. Apply transversality to




where the hat omits the last J rows of ∆m. This is transverse to zero. The burden of the argument is to























16We want to make d




H [aH]φ, so d




Suppose for a moment that θ
h 6=0 for some h, say θ
h
j 6=0 . Then we set ˙ P
i6=h
=0 and ˙ P
h
to zero in
every column but − α
θh
j
in column j, for an arbitarary α. Then d
dξ∆m φ = −Σ ˙ P
h
θ




j = α can
be made arbitary, as desired.
Now we justify that θ
h 6=0 for some h —better, any h. Since a has rank J ≥ H,[aH] has rank H,
hence so does Λh
H [aH], recalling λ
h À 0. Therefore θ
h 6=0 whenever φ 6=0 , true since φ
0φ − 1=0 .
By the transversality theorem, generically in endowments and utilities the system of dimp+dimq+(S+
1)(C −1)+1 equations is transverse in the remaining dimp+dimq+H variables. Since (S +1)(C −1) >
S>J≥ H, by the preimage theorem, for these every GEI has ˆ ∆m (a fortiori ∆m) with linearly columns.
Deﬁnition 2 We say a is regular if every S − 1 rows have rank J.
Lemma 4 (Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions) If H>1 and a is regular, then generically in
endowments and utilities, whenever ˜ k ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J is nonzero everywhere and β ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J,a t
every GEI there is a path of risk aversion that solves ˙ ∆ =0 ,˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = β
0.
Proof. Fix generic endowments from the next lemma. We follow remark 1. Setting ˙ Bh =0 , ˙ mh =0
we see









































17So solving ˙ ∆ =0 amounts to solving (a) Σ ˙ P
h
Λh
H [aH]=0 . We also see
˙ ∇ = Σ ˙ S
h
Lh












































So solving ˜ k0 ˙ ∇ = β
0 amounts to solving (b) β
0
p = ˜ k0 ˙ ∇p = ˜ k0
pΣ ˙ A
h
Lh + ˜ k0
qΣ ˙ P
h0
Lh and (c) β
0






0 by splitting ˙ ∇ =[˙ ∇p : ˙ ∇q]. To begin, suppose the ˙ P
h
have been chosen to solve (a), (c). Then
to solve (b) β
0
p = ˜ k0
pΣ ˙ A
h
Lh + ˜ k0
qΣ ˙ P
h0
Lh,w ec h o o s e ˙ A
h>1
=0 and solve β
0
p = ˜ k0
p ˙ A
1












by setting ˙ A
1
as follows. It must be symmetric, to be a Slutsky perturbation,
so let it be the diagonal matrix with entries αi
˜ ki , recalling by assumption ˜ k is nonzero in every coordinate.
It remains to choose the ˙ P
h










0. Since ˜ k1 6=0 , we perturb only
the ﬁrst row 1 of ˙ P
h












Of course, given ˙ P
h>1
















remains to choose the ˙ P
h>1
1 to solve Σ ˙ P
h
1Λh
H [aH]=0 with ˙ P
1































































[aH] have rank H, for then Σh>1 ˙ P
h






˜ k1 has a solution
with ˙ P
h>2
1 =0 and some ˙ P
2









s. Since [aH] has full rank H ≤ J, so does [˜ aH] if ls 6=0for every s, which is the
case given our choice of endowments from the next lemma.









is nonzero for every h>1 and s>0.
18The proof is standard, involving changes in the utilities’ gradient through changes in the endowments.
7A p p e n d i x
7.1 Derivation of formula for welfare impact
It is standard how Debreu’s smooth preferences, linear constraints, and the implicit function theorem imply
the smoothness of neoclassical0 demand. In fact, the implicit function theorem implies smoothness of neo-
classical demand in a neighborhood ˜ b ≈ b ∈ B, if neoclassical0 demand is active at b ∈ B0. It is standard
also that the envelope property follows from the value function’s local smoothness, which is the case for vh
as the composition of smooth functions:
Dbvh = DbL(x,y,λ
h) |(xh,yh)(b)
where b =( p,q,a,wh,t) and
L(x,y,λ



















[xh]0 + Dpτht : yh


























0 : −Ψh : −I : τh¢
19So much for demand theory. Recalling regular GEI from the subsection on the Expression for the Price
Adjustment, dP 0 =( dp0,dq0) exists and
wh =[ p]0eh + th
∗r ⇒
dwh =[ eh]0dp + th
∗dr
=( [ eh]0 :0 ) dP + th
∗τ
using dr = τ from the Revenue Impact proposition.
Thus the welfare impact at a regular GEI is




0):−Ψh : −I : τh¢
·
¡










zh0dP − ΨhDta − th
∗τ + τh¢
where zh0 ≡ ([xh − eh]0 : yh
0) by deﬁnition and
Dta =
⎡














∗τ − τh + ΨhDta − zhdP
¢
7.2 Aggregate notation
We collect marginal utilities of contingent income, and denote stacking by an upperbar
(λ)0 ≡
⎡






















dv =( λ)0 ¡¡
th




To visualize the bracket notation [·] deﬁned in footnote 7, it staggers state contingent vectors:
[p] ≡
⎡












Af u n c t i o n F : M ×Π → N deﬁnes another one Fπ : M → N by Fπ(m)=F(m,π). Given a point 0 ∈ N
consider the ”equilibrium set” E = F−1(0) and the natural projection E → Π,(m,π) 7→ π. A function is
proper if it pulls back sequentially compact sets to sequentially compact sets.
Remark 2 (Transversality) Suppose F is a smooth function between ﬁnite dimensional smooth mani-
folds. If 0 is a regular value of F,t h e ni ti sar e g u l a rv a l u eo f Fπ for almost every π ∈ Π. The set of
such π is open if in addition the natural projection is proper.
As u b s e to f Π is generic if its complement is closed and has measure zero. Write C∗ = C(S +1). Here
the set of parameters is
Π = O × O0 × (0,²)
where O,O0 are an open neighborhoods of zero in RC∗H,R
C∗(C∗+1)
2 H relating to endowments and symmetric
perturbations of the Hessian of utilities. We have in mind a ﬁxed assignment of utilities, which we perturb
by O0 × (0,²).S p e c i ﬁcally, given an equilibrium commodity demand x by some household and ¤ ∈
R
C∗(C∗+1)




(x − x)0¤(x − x)
21where ωα : R → R is a smooth bump function, ωα |(− α
2 , α
2 )≡ 1 and ωα |R\(−α,α)≡ 0.I nan e i g h b o r h o o d




(x − x)0¤(x − x)
Du¤,α(x)=Du(x)+( x − x)0¤ ⇒ Du¤,α(x)=Du(x)
D2u¤,α(x)=D2u(x)+¤
So in an α-neighborhood the Hessian changes, by ¤, but the gradient, demand do not. For small enough
α,¤ this utility remains in Debreu’s setting, so neoclassical demand is deﬁned and smooth when active.
In the Suﬃcient Independence of Reactions, the path of risk aversion is identiﬁed with a linear path
(¤h,αh)(ξ) ≡ (¤hξ, kx
hk
2 ) for each household, so that d
dξD2uh
¤,α(x)=¤h.
228F i g u r e s
risk aversion ra
dP k'  
dP  is k-sensitive 
dP  is not k-sensitive 
dP  is not k-sensitive at both equilibria 
of the economy  (e,ra) =   … 
… however  dP  is k-sensitive at both equilibria 
of the nearby economies  (e,ra) =   ,   
risk aversion ra
dP k'  
nearby  dP  k-sensitive still 
nearby  dP  k-sensitive now 
endowment e 
Along the dots  dP  is not k-sensitive.  
They arise from the one-dimensional path …   
risk aversion ra
dP k'  
endowment e 
dP  is k-sensitive at both equilibria 
of all shaded economies     save those dotted     (=generic) 
… plotted in the shade.  
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